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No political truth is of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that... the
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in
the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.
-James Madison, The Federalist,No. 47.
I. INTRODUCTION

Madison's observation relates to the fundamental separated powers
structure that lies at the core of federal and state constitutions in the United States.
While the federal constitution and those of the states all share the separation of
powers format, unlike the federal constitution, a key structural feature of state
constitutions is the "non-unified" or divided executive branch.
In forty-three states, including West Virginia, the executive department
operates under the supervision of an elected Governor and elected executive
department officers. The holders of these constitutional executive department
offices may be members of differing political parties. Typical executive officers
created by state constitutions are Treasurer, Auditor, Attorney General,
Superintendent of Schools, and Secretary of State. Even if all executive officers are
members of the same political party, because each is an independently elected
executive officer, each may possess significantly different perspectives as to
desirable policies under prevailing law. Each officer may have different views on
the proper operation of their offices in relation to other components of the
executive, legislative and judicial departments. In addition, in a divided executive
department, the elected executive officers may assume differing positions regarding
issues of policy which arise in the administration of various state statutes.

I NATIONAL AssociATioN OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 15 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) [hereinafter NAAG REPORT].
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For the better part of a century, West Virginia's Attorney General has
struggled intermittently with other constitutional executive officers and the state's
legislature to block encroachment on the core functions of the office. The Attorney
General's unique calling is to provide legal services to the diverse and often
conflicting interests of elected and appointed state officials and agencies2 Such a
job challenges the most competent and ethical of lawyers. The Attorney General
must avoid conflicts of interest and other pitfalls involving legal ethics while often
being called upon to represent elected officers of another political party or political
appointees asserting legal and policy positions at odds with her own.
If this environment were not complex enough, in West Virginia, repeated
attempts have been made by state agencies and officers to employ lawyers other
than those assigned by the Attorney General.3 These attempts to emasculate the
Attorney General's authority by transferring her responsibility to others in
government are little more than power plays expected of competing political
interests. If political dominance of one force over another in state politics were the
only fruit borne by such conflict, it would simply be written off as partisan political
in-fighting.
More is at stake however, when the powers and duties of constitutionally
elected state officials are usurped. At issue is the decision of constitutional framers
to decentralize governmental power as part of the system of checks and balances
that is so familiar to high school civics students. This separation of powers doctrine
lies at the core of the controversy discussed below.

2 In a dissenting opinion issued shortly before this article was scheduled for publication, Justice

Starcher of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals emphasized the constitutional basis for
creation of the office of Attorney General in a divided executive branch:
one of the principal reasons that our founders established an Attorney General's
office was to assure that important legal issues that will affect all state agencies
had an advocate who is able to bring the expertise of government-wide
representation before this Court, when we consider matters of overall importance
to state government.
West Virginia Div. of Envtl. Protection v. Kingwood Coal Co., No. 23876, 1997 WL 406153, at n.1
W. Va. S.Ct.App. July, 16, 1997) (Starcher, J. dissenting).
' Justice Starcher also recently observed a current example of the potentially adverse impact of state
officials and agencies represented by lawyers other than those employed and supervised by the
Attorney General:
The DEP is not represented by the Attorney General in this case, but by their own
agency counsel, as permitted in the statute. This situation . . . can lead to
problems. Important issues of what and how law applies to the State may be
considered by this Court without the input and exercise of the State's chief legal
officer, and without consideration of the impact on decisions on these issues upon
a wide variety of government agencies.
Id.; see also infra, note 44 and accompanying text.
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When a constitution's discrete and thoughtfully crafted structure is
realigned or altered by self-serving political interests without constitutional
sanction, the foundation of a democratic system is corrupted and weakened. An
over-arching theme of this Article is the exposure of forces within state government
that subtly and often imperceptibly erode those foundations for self-serving political
reasons, and in so doing, contribute to the disempowerment of the very citizens they
are sworn to serve.
This Article provides a case study which focuses on the Office of the
Attorney General in one state government's divided executive branch. Examined
below is the constitutional allocation of power to the West Virginia Attorney
General and the internal conflicts within the divided executive and between the
executive and the legislative branches that inexorably arise in the context of such
a common state constitutional structure.
II. THE DIVIDED EXECUTIVE AND THE WEST
VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL

West Virginia shares a constitutionally designed divided executive
department with the vast majority of sister states. West Virginia's constitution, like
so many others, is structured in such way as to both check gubernatorial power and
diffuse executive authority among elected state house "row officers." The West
Virginia Constitution -- like those of many other states -- empowers the state
legislative branch to define the scope of the powers and duties of these elected
officials.4 In common with these states, West Virginia's constitution does not speak
explicitly to whether the legislature has the power to shift the duties of these elected
executive officials to other state offices and officials or to private parties.
A.

ConstitutionalStructureAnd The DividedExecutive

The Office of the Attorney General was established by the West Virginia
Constitution of 1872 as part of a divided or "non-unified" executive department.5
Article VII, section 1, created the offices of Governor, Attorney General, Auditor,

' See, e.g., In Estate of Sharp, 217 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Wis. 1974); Shute v. Frohmiler, 90 P.2d 998
(Ariz. 1939).
' The term "non-unified" is used here to distinguish the executive department of West Virginia's
constitutional scheme of government and most other states from the three States (Hawaii, New Jersey
and Alaska) that have a "unified" executive in the sense that the Governor is elected and appoints all
other executive officers. See, e.g., Robert J. Dilger, The Governor'sOffice: A ComparativeAnalysis,
W. VA. PuB.AFFAIRS REP., Fall 1993, at 2.
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and Treasurer. Later constitutional amendments added an elected Secretary of State
and Commissioner of Agriculture to the executive department.6
Article VII, section 1, provides that officers of the executive department
"shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law."7 Accordingly, the
legislature has prescribed duties of the Attorney General by statute.8 West Virginia
Code sections 5-3-1 to 5-3-3 set forth the general duties of the Attorney General. 9
Legislatively prescribed duties of the Attorney General may be traced to those
initially established by the Virginia Legislature in 1849.0
It is important to note that in 1932, West Virginia Code section 5-3-1 was
amended to prohibit expenditure of public funds for legal services provided by any
private person, firm, or corporation." While generally prohibiting the hiring of
private lawyers to provide legal services for the state, the Legislature has provided
in West Virginia Code section 5-3-3 for the appointment of assistant Attorneys
General to the extent necessary to assist in performing the duties of the office of
Attorney General. 2 Such assistants are to be appointed by and serve at the pleasure

6

The Secretary of State was added to the executive department in 1902. 1901 W. Va. Acts 451,

ratified by popular vote, Nov. 4, 1902. A 1934 amendment to article VII, section 1, added the office
of Commissioner of Agriculture to the list of constitutionally designated executive department officers.
1933 W. Va. Acts 213, 1st Ex. Sess., ratified by popular vote, Nov. 6, 1934.
7 W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
' The debates regarding the proposed Constitution of 1872 included discussion of the role of the
Attorney General in the Executive Department of state government. In adopting a provision relating
to the election of the officers of the executive branch, the convention voted to have the Attorney
General's term of office and date of election correspond with that of the Governor, the Auditor, and
the Treasurer. In that context it was stated on the floor of the constitutional convention that "[t]he
attorney general is an officer of the State, he is the Governor's law adviser. . . ." DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF WEST VIRGINIA, 1861-1863, at 984
(Charles H. Ambler et al., eds., 1939).
9 Other statutes require the Attorney General to perform additional duties. See supra note 8.
10 Ch.

165, § 1, Va.Code of 1849.

1932 W. Va. Acts 2, Ist Ex. Session. Section 5-3-1 was re-enacted as amended in 1994. 1994 W.
Va. Acts 353.
"

W. VA. CODE § 5-3-3 (1994). "[C]ompensation of all such assistanto [attorneys general] shall be
within the limits of the amounts appropriated by the Legislature for personal services." Id. This
language is consistent with and authorizes the current practice of State agencies contracting with the
Office of the Attorney General for legal services and the payment for such contracted services from the
agency's budget allocated from "amounts appropriated by the Legislature for personal services" for
that agency. Id.
12
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of the Attorney General. They are required to perform those duties that the
Attorney General assigns to them.
West Virginia Code section 5-3-1 is examined below in order to determine
the nature and scope of the statute's ban on payment of public funds for legal
services performed for State officers, commissions and boards, by persons and
entities who have neither been appointed nor supervised by the Attorney General.
B.

Statutory Duties Of The Attorney General

The West Virginia legislature has by statute assigned a variety of
responsibilities to the Attorney General. For example, West Virginia Code section
5-3-1 requires the Attorney General to provide legal services, upon written request,
to:
the governor, secretary of state, auditor, state superintendent of
schools, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, board of public
works, tax commissioner, commissioner of banking, adjutant
general, commissioner of division of energy (now the division of
environmental protection), superintendent of public safety,
commissioner of public institutions, road commission,
commissioner of the bureau of employment programs, public
service commission, and any other state officer, board, or
commission, or the head of any state educational, correctional,
3
penal, or eleemosynary institution.'
The legal services that the Attorney General is duly bound to provide under section
5-3-1 include the following: written opinions and advice on questions of law;
prosecution and defense of suits, actions, and other legal proceedings; generally
rendering and performing all other legal services; and rendering to the President of
the Senate and/or the Speaker of the House of Delegates a written opinion or advice
upon any written questions submitted to him by either or both of them. 4
West Virginia Code section 5-3-2 requires the Attorney General to provide
other additional and numerous legal services for the state. These services include
appearance as counsel for the state in all causes pending in the Supreme Court of
Appeals in which the state is interested, appearance as counsel for the state in all
causes in any federal court in which the state is interested, and appearance in any

'3

W. VA. CODE

'4

id.

§ 5-3-1 (1994).
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cause in which the state is interested that is pending in any other court in the state,
all upon the written request of the Governor. 5
Upon written request, the Attorney General is also required by section 5-3-2
to institute and prosecute all civil actions "in favor of or for the use of the state"
which may be "necessary in the execution of the official duties of any state officer,
board or commission."" Further, when requested by the prosecuting attorney of a
county where a state correctional institution is located, the Attorney General is to
provide attorneys for appointment as special prosecuting attorneys. The Attorney
General is also required by the statute to consult with and advise county prosecuting
attorneys in matters relating to the official duties of their office.
Miscellaneous statutorily mandated duties include "keep[ing] proper
books, a register of all causes prosecuted or defended by [the office of the Attorney
General] in behalf of the state or its officers and of the proceedings had in relation

W. VA. CODE § 5-3-2 (1994), providing in pertinent part:
When such appearance is entered he shall take charge of and have control of such
cause; he shall defend all actions and proceedings against any state officer in his
official capacity in any of the courts of this state or of the any federal courts when
the state is not interested in such cause against such officer, but should the state
be interested against such officer, he shall appear for the state.

15

Id.
16

Id.

" This responsibility of the Attorney General to assist the prosecuting attorney in counties where state

prisons or similar facilities are located relates only to the prosecution of criminal proceedings. The
duty of the Attorney General to assist is not triggered until a circuit judge in the county or ajustice of
the state Supreme Court finds that "extraordinary circumstances exist at said institution which render
the financial resources of the office of the prosecuting attorney inadequate to prosecute said cases."
Id.
8 A written report may be required from the prosecuting attorneys setting forth "the state and

condition" of the cases in which the state is a party, pending in the courts of their respective counties.
Id. The Attorney General may also require the several prosecuting attorneys to perform, within the
respective counties in which they are elected, "any of the legal duties required to be performed by the
attorney general which are not inconsistent with the duties of the prosecuting attorneys as the legal
representatives of their respective counties." Id. When the performance of these duties by the
prosecuting attorney conflicts with her/his duties as the legal representative of a county, or if for any
reason any prosecuting attorney is disqualified from performing such duties, the Attorney General
"may require the prosecuting attorney of any other county to perform such duties in any county other
than that in which such prosecuting attorney is elected." Id.
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thereto." 9 The statute also requires appearance by the Attorney General as counsel
for any National Guardsman in certain narrow circumstances."
In addition to setting forth the duties of the Attorney General as the
"general lawyer for the State,"' West Virginia Code section 5-3-1 flatly prohibits
the expenditure of state funds for the retention of private lawyers to perform legal
services for any of the public officials, commissions or other persons mentioned in
that section.22

19 Id.

20 The Attorney General's duty of representation arises "upon [the] request of any member of the West

Virginia national guard who has been named defendant in any civil action arising out of that
guardsman's action while under orders from the governor relating to national guard assistance in
disasters and civil disorders." Id The duties above the Attorney General are further supplemented by
other statutory responsibilities. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 47-18-6 to 7 (1996) (requiring Attorney
General's Office to enforce state antitrust laws); and W. VA. CODE § 46A-7-102 (1996) (giving
Attorney General investigatory and enforcement powers to administer consumer protection laws).
W. VA. CODE § 5-3-1 (1994) (reenacted in 1994, supra note 11). The Supreme Court of Appeals
has recognized that the Attorney General is the "general lawyer for the state." Manchin v. Browning,
296 S.E.2d 909, 917 (W. Va. 1982).
21

§ 5-3-1 (1994):
[I]t shall be unlawful from and after the time this section becomes effective for any
of the public officers, commissions, or other persons above mentioned to expend
any public funds of the state of West Virginia for the purpose of paying any
person, firm, or corporation for the performance of any legal services.

22 W. VA. CODE
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III. STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF "OUTSIDE" LEGAL SERVICES:
2
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS 3

A.

Pre-1963 Perspective

The nature of the problems attendant to the employment of lawyers who are
not hired or supervised by the Attorney General, has long been recognized in West
Virginia.24 For example, between 1905 and 1932, three Attorneys General warned
of the extremely serious consequences flowing from the employment of such
counsel.' The second part of this section reviews a 1963 official opinion of the
Attorney General, the most exhaustive discussion of the issue to date.
In 1932, after Governor Howard M. Gore and Attorney General Howard B.
Lee expressed serious concern regarding "the presence upon the state payroll of
numerous attorneys other than those directly employed by the Attorney General,"
the legislature took action to deal with the problem? 6 The result was an amendment
to West Virginia Code section 5-3-1 strictly prohibiting payment for legal services
other than those provided by the Attorney General.2
Subsequently, in 1943, acting Attorney General Ira J. Partlow received a
request for an official opinion from the State Tax Commissioner asking Partlow to
determine whether an item in the Commissioner's budget -- which authorized that
"not more than $6,000.00 annually should be expended only for Special Legal

' "Outside" legal services and "outside counsel" as used in this Article refer to legal services provided
by lawyers who are notretained, employed and supervised by the Attorney General. The terms apply
herein to lawyers employed as so-called "in house" counsel directly by executive agencies and offices
as well as to lawyers and law firms hired by such agencies and offices as "outside" counsel. The terms
"outside legal services" and "outside counsel" as used herein do not apply to lawyers and law firms
hired by or with the approval of the Attorney General and thereafter supervised by the office of the
Attorney General. The terms also exclude those lawyers and law firms retained with the approval of
the Attorney General but not supervised by her in circumstances where such retainer is required
because a conflict of interest does not permit the Attorney General to represent a state agency client.
24 In 1963, an official opinion of the Attorney General observed that "the practice of state officers and

agencies employing counsel outside of the Attorney General's office is not of recent vintage; it has
been the subject matter of critical comment for well over fifty years." 50 W. VA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL
REP.& OPINlONS 190 (1962-1964).
' See id at 190 (citing 21 W. VA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS (1905-1906); 31 W. VA.
ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONs xiii, xiv, xv (1925-1926)).
26

See 50 W. VA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS 185, 190 (1962-1964).

27 1932 W. Va. Acts 2, 1st Ex. Sess.
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Services"-- was proper in view of the prohibition contained in West Virginia Code
section 5-3-1. Partlow's response to this request stated that section 5-3-1 makes it
the duty of the Attorney General to act as counsel for designated state officials,
boards and commissions, including the Tax Commissioner.28 The opinion advised
that, to be consistent with the prohibition against payment for legal services
provided by lawyers other than those appointed by the Attorney General in West
Virginia Code section 5-3-1, the Tax Commissioner should utilize the budgeted
appropriation to pay for the legal services of counsel appointed by the Attorney
General.29
In 1956 yet another Attorney General, John G. Fox, also expressed his
strong disapproval of the practice of state agencies employing attorneys other than
those appointed by the Attorney General to perform legal services:
Former Attorney General Fox has estimated that there are
approximately a hundred attorneys employed in the various
departments of the State government, although only a few of them
are filling legal positions. He estimates also that at the time he took
office there were ten or fifteen such attorneys who were acting in
the capacity of 'house counsel' to the various departments by
which they were employed. Such practice results in numerous
difficulties, one being that a department head may act upon the
advice of an attorney within his department, who is not actually a
practicing attorney, until the former has gotten in trouble, before
asking the Attorney General for assistance. Besides the fact that
additional work may be created for him, the Attorney General is
handicappedby the fact that he has not handled the matterfrom
the outset. Another is the conflict of opinions which would
undoubtedly resultfrom numerous independent legal advisors
within the administrativebranch of the State. It is apparently not
enough that the legislature has enacted a prohibition against the

28

40 W. VA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS 206 (1943). The opinion, after quoting the

relevant language of § 5-3-I stated, "[t]here is serious doubt in my mind as to whether the provisions
of the Budget Bill can repeal or modify a general law.... It is assumed that the bill will carry only
such appropriations as may be made without violating any provisions of general law." Id. at 207.
29 The use of budgeted appropriations of a state agency to reimburse the Office of the Attorney General

for legal services rendered by a duly appointed Assistant Attorney General was also endorsed by a
subsequent Attorney General opinion. See 50 W. VA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS 185,
194.
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expenditure of funds for legal services. Attorneys are employed by
department heads to fill nonlegal positions, often resulting
eventually in each attorney acting as 'house counsel' for his
department. 0
Thus, for more than the half of a century prior to 1963, attempts to circumvent
constitutional and statutory proscriptions of state agency retention of lawyers other
than those employed by the Attorney General were made and rebuffed.
B.

Attorney General's 1963 Opinion Interpreting Statutory Prohibition of
Retention of Outside Counsel

In 1963, then Attorney General C. Donald Robertson issued an official
opinion in response to a request made by the Speaker of the House of Delegates.3"
The Speaker requested a written opinion discussing the legality of expending West
Virginia's public funds to employ and pay attorneys for legal services to state
officers, departments of State government, commissions, agencies, boards and
instrumentalities created by the legislature or established under the laws of West
Virginia.32
30

50 W. VA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONs 185, 191 (quoting Lyell B. Clay, THE

ATrORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA 102 (1957)) (emphasis added).
3' The opinion referred to State v. Ehrlick, 64 S.E. 935 (W. Va. 1909), but did not rely on Ehrlick in

discussing the lawfulness of state agencies and officials using public funds to pay private persons, firms
or corporations for legal services. 50 W. VA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONs at 191. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia subsequently overruled Ehrlick in Manchin, 296 S.E.2d
909 (W. Va. 1982). However, the fact that Ehrlick was later overruled is irrelevant to both the analysis
and the conclusions drawn by the Attorney General's 1963 Opinion. Indeed, in a case decided after
Manchin, the court found the 1963 opinion to be "persuasive." State ex rel. Caryl v. MacQueen, 385
S.E.2d 646, 649 (W. Va. 1989).

" The opinion explained that there is no legal impediment to persons with law degrees working in
government in administrative positions that do not involve the rendering of legal services. 50 W. VA.
ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS 185. Thus, the opinion distinguished lawyers who work in
government from lawyers whose workfor government entails providing legal services. It should also
be noted that nothing in the history of W. Va. Code § 5-3-1 nor any opinion of the Attorney General
regarding that provision of law suggests that the employment of attorneys as administrators in
government is prohibited by that statute. On the contrary, there are many attorneys employed in
administrative capacities by state departments. This practice is appropriate insofar as such individuals
provide administrative and management assistance to State government. However, as the 1963
Attorney General's opinion emphasized, "such attomeys- holding administrative positions[] are
prohibited from receiving State funds for 'any legal services' rendered to the employer-departments."
50 W. VA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS 185, 192 (1962-1964).
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The resulting opinion, a most exhaustive examination of the scope of the
Attorney General's authority, was based primarily on an analysis of the statutory
prohibitions of outside legal services. Moreover, the opinion outlines in detail the
rationale for such a prohibition. Not surprisingly, the opinion takes on an expansive
view of Attorney General's powers and a most restrictive interpretation of the
authority of state agencies to retain counsel other than those supplied by the
Attorney General. Interestingly, however, over the period of more than a century
of state governance under a divided executive department, not one publication has
advocated or otherwise articulated the case for allowing retention of outside
counsel.
The 1963 opinion addresses in detail several issues central to the question
explored in this Article. Attorney General Robertson focused on interpretation of
the statutory prohibition of hiring outside counsel, the rationale for this limitation,
and the constitutional basis that underlies it.
1.

Statutory Interpretation

The 1963 opinion found that the effect of West Virginia Code sections
5-3-1 and 5-3-2 was "to impose upon the Attorney General responsibility to perform
' Moreover,
all legal services for the State."33
the opinion explained that "[t]he terms
of Code § 5-3-1, reciting specific duties of the Attorney General, merely serve to
illustrate that the complete responsibility of the legal affairs of the State of West
Virginia is centered in the Office of the Attorney General."34 Thus, the opinion
stated:
Every legal service, which the Attorney General may be requested
to render any state office or agency, is, of course, not enumerated
in the statute. The phrases, "generally render and perform all other
legal services" and "any other state officer, board or commission"
are certainly all encompassing. A more comprehensive word than
the word "all" cannot be found in the English language; the word
"any", likewise, is a comprehensive term meaning "every" or "all"
or "no matter what one." 35

31 Id. at 187.
34

Id. at 187-88.

31 Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
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The opinion declared that as a general rule the power of state agencies to employ
"in-house counsel" is not incident to the mere existence of the agency. "This
conclusion," the opinion noted, "is especially true where statutes specifically place
on the Attorney General the duty of furnishing legal advice and services to such
state officials, departments and agencies."36
2.

Rationale for Limitation of "In-House" Counsel

As explained above, the primary purpose of the 1963 Attorney General's
opinion was to interpret that portion of West Virginia Code section 5-3-1 that bans
the payment of public funds for performance of any legal services other than those
provided by the Attorney General. The opinion carefully analyzed the rationale for
limiting the employment of counsel from outside the office of the Attorney General.
It identified the Attorney General's role in overseeing the development of the
administrative law of state agencies as one important reason to significantly limit
the employment of other lawyers who have no responsibility for such
development."
The 1963 opinion also identifies numerous other problems that arise from
the presence of department-employed counsel in various executive departments. It
warned of "house counsel" of a department appearing in court proceedings and
elsewhere, representing himself to be an assistant Attorney General, when in fact
the lawyer did not hold that office. Another possibility suggested was that "house
counsel" of one department may appear in court proceedings on behalf of the State,
presenting claims only for his or her department, while failing to assert in such
proceedings pending claims of another agency. "House counsel" of an agency
might also issue an opinion in direct conflict with official opinions issued by the
Attorney General.38

36 Id. (citations omitted).
37 The 1963 opinion recognized that the opinions of the Attorney General provide "a major portion

of the administrative law of [the] State." 50 W. VA. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONs at 189.
"In rendering opinions and advising as to questions of law in matters affecting executive departments,
and agencies, he is... establishing a body of administrative law." Id. at 189. The 1963 opinion also
emphatically states that opinions rendered by the "department-employed attorney" have no legal effect
whatsoever. "A department-employed attorney has no mandate from the people; he has no greater or
higher standing than private counsel. Public funds of the State paid to him for his services are strictly
in violation of Code 5-3-1." Id. at 189.
38 It is conceivable that an agency's "house counsel" might advise citizens that his or her agency was

not going to abide by official opinions of the Attorney General.
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Attorney General Robertson's opinion also raised the specter of an attorney
employed by an agency to prepare interpretations of statutes or give advice on what
is permissible under the law. Because such lawyers' salaries are paid by the agency,
it would be difficult for these persons to "maintain the degree of objective
detachment which every conscientious attorney should maintain in rendering an
opinion to a client." 9
The opinion also considered the division of loyalties that face "in-house"
counsel, who must represent the agency head who hires him or her, rather than
being insulated from direct supervision by the state's "general counsel" -- the
Attorney General. The opinion asserted that:
[An attorney] ...has several loyalties and is subject to certain
psychological influences in his work. Among these are loyalty to
his clients, to the community, to the administration ofjustice, to his
associates in practice, and to himself (where his own economic
interests and ethical standards are concerned). These divergent and
sometimes conflicting loyalties and influences must somehow be
reconciled. With the use of State department-employed "house
counsel" these loyalties and psychological influences are too easily
distorted, making it difficult, if not impossible, for such
department-employed attorneys to render independent opinions,
free of bias and influence.40
It seems apparent, as the 1963 opinion argues, that such divided loyalties can
interfere with the Attorney General's ability to carry out her constitutionally
mandated duties. Among the problems implicated by divided loyalties are (1)
interference with the Attorney General's duty and obligation to develop consistency
regarding the construction and application of administrative law, (2) disruption of
the relationship between the Attorney General and her executive department clients,
(3) creation of ethical conflicts where none otherwise exist, and ultimately (4) the
undermining of the public interest implicit in the constitutional separation of powers
scheme.
The 1963 opinion asserted that a lawyer employed by the Attorney General
is bound to provide her independent judgment on legal issues. She must take into

" Id. at 192. Of course a similar charge could be made regarding salaried lawyers representing nongovernmental clients. A principal difference is the constitutional design of a divided executive branch
render lawyers employed and paid by the Attorney General more likely to maintain desirable objective
detachment.
40

Id.
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consideration the inter-connected interests of all state government agencies, as well
as the interests of the individual agency that requested legal advice. In contrast,
agency-retained counsel may not possess the broader view and knowledge of state
government possessed by the Attorney General, and therefore find it difficult to
render the requisite independent legal judgment.4 The 1963 opinion observed that
problems of the type quoted above motivated the Legislature in 1932 strictly to
prohibit the expenditure of public funds for department-employed counsel.42
3.

Constitutional Basis for Limitation of Outside Counsel

The 1963 opinion identified a Constitutional basis underlying the
proscription of legal services provided to the state by others than the staff of the
Attorney General:
Since [the Constitution has explicitly designated the Attorney
General as the general lawyer for state government and] the
Legislature has directed a centralization of all of the State's legal
business in the Office of the Attorney General, then it is his
complete responsibility to attend to all legal affairs of the State. 4

4, The opinion stated:

Department-employ[ed] counsel are more inclined to rationalize, finding "good"
reasons to justify their department-employers' policies rather than seek the "real"
reasons (based on sincere concern for the public welfare of all of the people) upon
which to impartially evaluate the department's questions of law. "House counsel"
in a department naturally would be hesitant to inform that the action taken or
about to be taken by his department head is unauthorized or unlawful. It is
important that departments of state government receive legal advice which is free
from domination, subjection, control, restriction, limitation or modification. An
attorney's opinions and advice should be the result of candor and fairness on the
part of the attorney. In state government numerous problems arise in the
administration of a department where the attorneyol ... must exercise his power
of choosing, selecting and electing a course to follow. A department-employed
attorney, being dependent upon his employer's pleasure for a livelihood, can
hardly be expected, regardless of his personal honesty and sincerity, to preserve
that independence ofjudgment which is so imperative in a representative of the
legal profession, which seeks to achieve "Equal Justice under Law."
Id. at 193.

42

50 W. VA. ATT'Y GEN.

BIENNIAL REP.

& OPINIONs at 193.

4I Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
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In sum, the 1963 opinion found that the effect of state agency retention of lawyers
other than those appointed by the Attorney General may severely undercut the
ability to carry out effectively her constitutional responsibilities as the state's chief
legal officer. To permit various State departments and agencies to "dilute and chip
away" centralized legal service by retaining their own attorneys to perform "legal
service," it was argued, will result in overlapping of authority, loss of uniformity in
State administrative policies and unnecessary duplication of efforts which waste
pubic funds." In light of the above, it is not surprising that the 1963 opinion
reached an unequivocal conclusion:
Under our statute [W. Va. Code § 5-3-1] ... it is clearly unlawful
for any public officers, commissions, departments or agencies of
the State to spend any of the State's funds in payment for the
performance of any legal services unless it can be affirmatively
shown that there is express and unambiguous statutory authority to
retain such legal counsel.45
C.

Analysis of Statutory Prohibition

When it enacted West Virginia Code section 5-3-1 in 1933, the legislature
simply made explicit what the state's constitution implicitly demands: state funds
may not be used to pay for legal services provided by a lawyer who has not been
chosen nor supervised by the Attorney General. The statutory bar in section 5-3-1
makes clear that the employment by state agencies and officers of in-house and
outside counsel usurps the core constitutional function of the Attorney General.

" Id.; accord Kingwood Coal Co., 1997 WL 406153, at *20 (Starcher, J. dissenting)
50 W. VA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS at 193 (emphasis added). The 1963 opinion
might be read as suggesting that express, unambiguous statutory authority would authorize the payment
of public funds for legal services provided by outside counsel. However, in this context a more
reasonable interpretation of the opinion is that while such express statutory authority for state agencies
and officials is required to spend state funds, authorization to spend public funds does not, and could
not, negate the implicit requirement that such counsel be hired with the approval and supervision of
the Attorney General. Id. at 194. This is consistent with the opinion given in 1943 by Attorney
General Ira J. Partlow. See 40 W. VA. Ar'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. & OPINIONS 206, 206 (1943). The
opinion suggested an approach to intra-executive cooperation in the provision of legal services that is
utilized to an extent today in West Virginia. Agencies may request that "the Attorney General...
assign an Assistant Attorney General to perform legal services for a particular department, or
departments, providing that such departments reimburse the Attorney General's budget for the expense
thereof." Id. "In this manner," the opinion suggested, "a proper control of personnel and funds can
be effected according to legislative directive." Id.
41
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The drafters of the Constitution of West Virginia and the voters who
ratified it created the office of Attorney General to serve as the state's general
lawyer.46 Implicit in the statutory prohibition of section 5-3-1 is a recognition of the
constitutional designation of the Attorney General as the lawyer who is to serve as
general counsel for the state. Section 5-3-1 also should be read as an explicit
warning that such constitutional designation cannot not be overridden by the
decision of an appointed or elected executive officer to employ and to pay for legal
services provided by someone else. Similarly, the legislature may not accomplish
the same result by legislatively sanctioning the payment for legal services of
in-house or outside counsel with public funds unless the lawyers performing the
services are chosen and supervised by the Attorney General. Such legislation would
run afoul of the separation of powers mandate of article V, section 1 of the West
Virginia Constitution.
The explicit prohibition of payment for legal services delivered by lawyers
not retained nor supervised by the Attorney General in section 5-3-1 leaves no room
for conjecture. Payment of public funds for legal services in violation of section
5-3-1 is patently unlawful. Those who are responsible for the hiring and payment
of such lawyers may clearly be held accountable, in the manner provided by law,
for the misapplication of public funds.
However, two opinions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
suggest, in dicta, that the legislature by explicit statutory authorization may allow
for the employment and payment of state funds to lawyers not appointed and
supervised by the Attorney General.47 There currently exists a narrow category of
in-house and outside counsel employed and paid pursuant to a few special statutes.
These special statutes seem at variance with the general prohibition contained in
section 5-3-1 in that they purport to explicitly authorize payment for legal services
notwithstanding section 5-3-1's bar. Careful scrutiny must be given to the wording
of such statutes to determine if, indeed, such explicit authorization was intended.
The fact that the legislature enacted statutes authorizing state agencies and
constitutional executive branch officers to retain in-house or outside counsel who
are neither hired nor supervised by the Attorney General is obviously not
dispositive of the constitutional validity of such legislation. The question of
46 See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
41

Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 919; MacQueen, 385 S.E.2d at 649.

4 Explicit authorization would require that the language of the provision specifically state that
payment for legal services may be made, notwithstanding the requirements of West Virginia Code §
5-3-1. A general authorization of an agency to employ counsel should be construed in a manner
consistent with section 5-3-1. Thus, this general language would allow no more than payment by the
agency to the office of the Attorney General for legal services provided by that office.
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whether constitutional separation of powers principles preclude the legislature from
assigning to others the Attorney General's core function of providing legal services
to the state is an issue of first impression that has yet to be resolved by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.49 However, the following section explores this
issue when considering the scope of the Attorney General's duties.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DUTIES

Several opinions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals have
addressed the powers and duties of the Attorney General of West Virginia.
A.

Constitutional and Common Law Powers: State ex rel. Manchin v.
Browning"0

In 1909, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
Attorney General possessed common law powers and dutiesY' For more than sixty
years after the court decided State v. Ehrlick 2 the Attorney General was believed
to posses broad common law powers, although no cases dealt directly with the
scope of the power of the office. 3 However, in State ex rel. Manchin v.
Browning, 4 the court overruled Ehrlick.5 The Manchin court analyzed the
historical roots of the office, holding that the West Virginia Constitution of 1873
49 However, as to the great majority of state agencies, offices and commissions, there exists absolutely
no colorable statutory authority that could be argued to constitute an exemption from section 5-3-1's

explicit prohibition. When such agencies, commissions, and offices expend public funds for legal
services provided by in-house and outside counsel, their action is both unlawful and untenable.
'o 296 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1982).
s' State v. Ehrlick, 64 S.E. 935, 936 (W. Va. 1909).
52 64 S.E. 935 (W. Va. 1909).
53 Ehrlick involved a dispute between a county prosecuting attorney and the Attorney General over

which official possessed the authority to restrain illegal gambling activity. Id. at 936. The court found
that the power rested with the Attorney General, reasoning that the office of the prosecutor was
conferred by the legislature, while "[t]he office of the Attorney General is of very ancient origin, and
its powers were recognized by the common law." Id.
54 296 S.E.2d 909.
55 To the extent that Ehrlick held that the Attorney General of West Virginia possessed common law

executive powers, it was overruled by Manchin. See id. at 915.
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did not invest in the Attorney General the powers and duties which the office had
previously possessed under the common law 6 Manchin involved a dispute over
whether the Attorney General had the duty to represent a state officer in court
litigation, even though he disagreed with the policy decision of that officer5 7 A
citizen suit was filed in federal district court against the West Virginia Secretary of
State, A. James Manchin, seeking to have a statute relating to apportionment of
congressional districts declared unconstitutional and to have the Secretary enjoined
from compelling Congressional candidates to run "at large." 8 The Secretary of
State sided with the federal court plaintiff in the civil action, agreeing that the
existing apportionment statute was unconstitutional. 9 The Attorney General took
the position that the apportionment statute was constitutional." In spite of this
conflict between lawyer and client, the Attorney General refused the Secretary's
request that special counsel be appointed to represent the Secretary in federal court

56

In Manchin, the court observed that the 1909 opinion "contained very little discussion of the history

of the office of Attorney General or the powers and duties reposed therein." Id. at 914. "Indeed," said
the court, "we find no in-depth analysis of the office of Attorney General as it exists today ....
." Id.
57The Manchin court stated:
Ordinarily the state acts only through its officers and agents. Indeed, it has long
been held that, in view of the constitutional prohibition contained in article VI,
section 35 against the state being made a party defendant in any lawsuit, a civil
action brought against a state officer or agency is not a suit against the state. All
state officers ... are sworn to uphold the constitutions ... and to execute
faithfully the duties of their offices. W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 5. Upon their oath
and in the performance of their statutorily prescribed duties, some officers.., are
empowered to make good faith policy decisions which implement the laws they
administer and comport with the requirements of our constitutions. Furthermore,
it is the duty of all state officers to interpret and implement the mandates of the
constitutions. When the official policies of a particular state officer or agency are
called into question in civil litigation, that officer or agency is entitled to the same
access to the courts and zealous and adequate representation by counsel to
vindicate the public interest, as is the private citizen . . . . His primary
responsibility [when a state official or agency is sued] is to provide proper
representation and competent counsel to the officer or agency on whose behalf he
appears. The Attorney General's role in this capacity is not to make public policy
in his own right on behalf of the state.... The Attorney General's role and duty
is to exercise his skill as the state's chief lawyer to zealously advocate and defend
the policy position of the officer or agency in the litigation.
Id. at 919-20 (citations omitted).
58

Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 912-913.

'9Id. at 913.
60

Id.
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litigation." The Secretary responded by filing a writ of mandamus with the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals arguing that the Secretary was entitled to legal
representation in federal court.6
Manchin, clearly indicates that the West Virginia Attorney General cannot
claim that the state's constitution grants to her broad common law powers.
Accordingly, this Article does not question that portion of the court's holding in
Manchin. The court's opinion in Manchin is relevant to this Article not because of
what the court held with regard to the scope of the office's common law powers, but
rather because of the court's articulation of the power the Attorney General
possesses as a constitutional officer in a divided executive branch of government.
In focusing on this latter import of the case, it is important to understand the precise
context in which the holding of Manchin was fashioned because Manchin did not
involve a dispute over the Attorney General's representation of a state official in a
non-litigation context. Thus, in Manchin, the Court was specifically addressing
only the role of the Attorney General in cases where he is defending a state officer
who has been sued; it did not consider circumstances where litigation is not
involved. 3
Manchin recognized that the powers and duties of the Attorney General in
this state are both constitutional and statutory in origin.' The Attorney General is
an elected constitutional officer of the executive department. The Court found that
the constitutional title "Attorney General," explicitly designated the holder of the
office as "general lawyer for the state." 5 The very nature of the office suggests no

61

Id.

62

Id.

63 The Manchin Court stated:

The Attorney General performs quite a different function when he appears to
defend a state officer who is sued in his official capacity. In this circumstance the
Attorney General does not appear as a party to the action. That role is filled by the
state officer against whom the suit is brought. Rather, the Attorney General's
function is to act as legal advisor and agent of the officer-litigant and to prosecute
or defend, within the bounds of the law, the decision or policy of such officer
which is called into question by such lawsuit.
Id. at 919.
64 Syllabus point 1 of Manchin states that "[tihe powers and duties of the Attorney General are

specified by the constitution and by rules of law prescribed pursuant thereto." Id. at Syl. Pt. I.
65 Id. at 918 (citation omitted). This observation simply recognizes that when the Constitution of 1872

created the elected office of Attorney General, while not intending to imbue the Office with common
law powers, it did intend to place in the executive department an elected "general lawyer" for the state
government.
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other possible role for an attorney general. Moreover, as explained below, by virtue
of the constitutional mandate that he be elected, the Attorney General possesses a
constitutional residuum of responsibility that may not be abrogated other than by
constitutional amendment.
Interestingly, in 1940 and 1989, constitutional amendments were proposed
by the legislature that would have abolished the elected constitutional offices of
Treasurer, Secretary of State, and Agriculture Commissioner. The proposed
amendments would have placed in the Governor the power to appoint such officers
who would serve at the Governor's will and pleasure. In each instance, West
Virginia voters overwhelmingly rejected66 the proposed amendments. The office
of Attorney General was not included in either of the rejected constitutional
amendments.
In Manchin, the court found that the constitution's framers had envisioned
that the Legislature would statutorily prescribe the duties of the state's general
lawyer. 7 Citing West Virginia Code section 5-3-1, the court held that "[b]y statute
the Attorney General is required to provide legal services to enumerated state
agencies and officials.., upon request."68 The court in Manchin also observed
that section 5-3-2 requires the Attorney General to represent and defend state
officers in court proceedings."9 Moreover, West Virginia Code section 5-3-2
requires the Attorney General "to act as legal counsel and representative on behalf
of the state."70
The court found that West Virginia Code sections 5-3-1 and 5-3-2 clearly
designate the Attorney General as the legal advisor and representative of the
Secretary of State and other state officers when they are sued in their official
capacities; and that the Attorney General is required to give legal advice, to

66 By a more than three to one margin in 1940 and a seven to one margin in 1989.

Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 917. The court explained that "the Attorney General is more properly
designated as the chief legal officer of the state, with the law as his area of special expertise. The
Attorney General, as a complement to the Governor, is the chief 'law-trained' officer of the state. By
the nature of his office, he is the generallawyerfor the state, an office he could not hold if he did not
have the proper legal qualifications and were not admitted to the bar." Id. (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
67

68

Id.

69 Id.

at 918.

70 Id. Manchin also observed that West Virginia Code section 5-3-2 provides that the Attorney

General "shall appear in any cause in which the state is interested that is pending in any other court in
the State, on the written request of the governor, and when such appearance is entered he shall take
charge of and have control of such cause." Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
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prosecute and defend suits and to appear in court on their behalf"' Citing West
Virginia Code section 5-3-1, the Manchin Court reached a conclusion about the
scope of that statute's prohibitory language:
by the plain terms of this statute it is unlawful for the executive
department of state government, the governor, the secretary of
state, the auditor, the state superintendent of free schools, [and
other enumerated state executive officials, boards and
commissions] to expend any public funds of the State of West
Virginia, for the purpose of paying any person, firm or corporation,
for the performance of any legal services.72
Therefore, when the Secretary of State asked the Attorney General to provide him
with legal counsel, he was operating within the constraints of section 5-3-1 since the
Secretary was 'forbidden by law... to hire outside counsel."'73
The court's opinion in Manchin negates the West Virginia Attorney General's
ability to exercise traditional common law powers that are incident to such office

71 Id. at

918. Manchin recognized other duties of the Attorney General as well. He is, for example,
"statutorily authorized to appear and 'represent the interests of the State' in all cases in that special
court of record, the Court of Claims." Id. at 919 (citation omitted). "He also has standing to exercise
judgment in the role of a party litigant when he appears in this Court as counsel for the state in criminal
appeals and other actions to which the State of West Virginia is a party. For example, the Attorney
General has the power and discretion to confess reversible error in criminal appeals before this Court."
Id.
72Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 917. The Manchin court noted in dicta that "[s]ome executive department
agencies are specifically exempted from this provision by virtue of statutory authorization to hire their
own counsel using agency funds." Id. 917, n.4. The Court identified the following state agencies as
having statutory authorization for hiring lawyers to provide legal services:
*
Bd. of Investments, § 12-6-5(6);
*
W. Va. Resource Recovery-Solid Waste Disposal Authority, § 16-26-6(12);
*
Department of Highways, § 17-2A-7;
Water Development Authority, § 20-5C-6(12);
*
Department of Employment Security, § 21A-2-18; and
*
Public Service Commission, § 24-1-8.
Id. In noting the existence of such statutes, the Court should properly be seen as merely having
observed that such statutory provisions appear to exempt the respective agencies from the prohibition
contained in West Virginia Code section 5-3-1. The case before the Court, however, did not present
the question of the relationship of section 5-3-I's statutory prohibition to any of the cited statutes. Nor
did Manchin address the constitutional separation of powers issues attendant to legislative enactments
which assign to others duties which are arguably solely within the purview of the Attorney General's
responsibilities as the state's general lawyer.
IId. at 921 (emphasis added).
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in many other states. Manchin clearly does not, however, address constitutional
questions concerning the scope of legislativepower to dilute the Attorney General's
constitutional duty to act as the general lawyer of the state. Indeed, the recognition
in Manchin and later cases that the Attorney General is the general lawyer for the
state, and that her duties are constitutional as well as statutory in origin, strongly
implies that core responsibilities of that office exist which may not be diluted by
legislative action.
B.

Subsequent Case Law

In State ex rel. Caryl v. MacQueen,74 the court held that "the Attorney
General remains the legal representative of the State and its agencies ....7 Caryl
noted that the role of the Attorney General is defined in West Virginia Code section
5-3-1, and that the Attorney General is charged with additional duties by West
Virginia Code section 5-3-2. The court explained that section 5-3-1 "clearly
charges the Attorney General with the duty to give his legal opinion and advice to
the Tax Commissioner."7 6 The court pointedly stated that "W. Va. Code §§ 5-3-1
and 5-3-2 make it ...clear that the Attorney General is required to act as the
representative and legal counsel on behalf of the State of West Virginia."7' 7
If you did not receive my resume or you need more information about me, please
feel free to call me at (540) 599 - 2052.

14

385 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1989).

' Id. at 650. In Caryl v. MacQueen, the State Tax Commissioner filed an action seeking to prohibit
a circuit judge from issuing a decision or releasing any information relating to the Commissioner's tax
compromise in a companion civil action. In a companion case, The Daily Gazette Co. Inc. v. Caryl,
380 S.E.2d 209 (W. Va. 1989), the Court held that tax compromise information sought by the
newspaper was statutorily exempted from disclosure under the West Virginia Freedom of Information
Act. In Daily Gazette the Court addressed the issue of "whether the relationship between the Attorney
General and the state Tax Commissioner is that of an attorney to client, which would have precluded
the Attorney General from disclosing the CSX tax compromise information existing in his files."
MacQueen, 385 S.E.2d at 647. As discussed in the text above, the Court held that an attorney-client
relationship did exist between the Tax Commissioner and the Attorney General. In dicta, the Court
suggested that the Attorney General may be "specifically exempted [from his duty as the legal
representative of the State and its agencies] by statute." Id. at 650.
76

Id. at 648.

1 Id. at 649, n.5. The Court also stated that "the Attorney General is required to give legal advice, to
prosecute and defend suits, and to appear in court on the State and its agencies' behalf." ld. at 649
(citing Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 917). "[E]ven in situations where the Attorney General stands as an
'administrator of the law,' he remains the legal representativeof the state and its citizens." Id. at 649
(emphasis added).
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As it did in Manchin, the court in Caryl held that "explicit in the title
attorney general is the proposition that the holder of the title is the general counsel
for the state."78 The Caryl court also observed that "W. Va. Code § 5-3-1 ...
forbids an agency to expend public funds for the purpose of payment of outside
counsel since the purpose of the Attorney General's office is to fulfill that role."'7 9
More recently, in State ex rel. Fahlgren Martin v. McGraw," and Lawyer
DisciplinaryBoard.v. McGraw,8 the court once again emphasized the role of the
Attorney General as the state's "chief legal officer."8
In summary, every modem decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia examining the constitutional and statutory duties of the state's
Attorney General has recognized the holder of the office to be the state's "chief
legal officer." Several opinions have recognized that the constitutional title
"Attorney General" explicitly designates the holder of the office as the state's
"general counsel." Thus, the courts have seemingly recognized a basic irreducible
residuum of power vested by the constitution in an elected Attorney General.
C.

The Code of Professional Conduct and Attorney General's Duty To
Represent the OrganizationalClient--the State

There is an additional reason why Manchin is relevant to the constitutional
separation of powers issue discussed herein. In Manchin, in addition to the
assertion that the Attorney General is the state's general lawyer pursuant to the state
constitution, the court also held that "[a]s a lawyer and officer of the courts of this
state, the Attorney General has the duty to conform his conduct to that prescribed
by the rules of professional ethics."83 Thus, one may look to the West Virginia

" Id. at 650 (citing Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 918).
'9

Id. at 649.

80 438 S.E.2d 338, 345 (W. Va.1993).

8'461 S.E.2d 850, 862 (W. Va.1995) (stating that the Attorney General is designated as "legal adviser
to state officers sued in their official capacities" and is the "state's chief lawyer").
"2 The FahlgrenMartin court emphasized that the Manchin court had recognized "the legislature's
intent to limit the power of the Attorney General to that of the State's lawyer rather than the State's law
enforcement officer." Fahlgren Martin, 438 S.E.2d at 345 n.7. See also McGraw v. Caperton, 446
S.E.2d 921 (W. Va. 1994).
Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 920. See also Lawyers Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 861
(W. Va.1995) ("The Attorney General is required to conform his actions to the Rules of Professional
Conduct, as is every lawyer in this State.") (citing Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 920).
83
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Rules of ProfessionalConduct to understand the nature of the Attorney General's
role as general lawyer of the state and her relationship to her government agency
clients. 4
As indicated above, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
observed that "explicit in the title attorney general is the proposition that the holder
of the title is the general counsel for the state," and that as general counsel
representing her government clients, she is subject to the Rules of Professional
Conduct." The Rules, applicable to an entity's general counsel in private business,
also apply to government lawyers, like the Attorney General, who are similarly
situated. They suggest the significant conflicts inherent in legislative attempts to
authorize legal representation of government officials and agencies by individuals
other than the state's general counsel.
A general counsel is, essentially, the general lawyer for an entity.86
Corporations commonly employ general counsel. One rationale supporting a
constitutional structure that calls for the election of the Attorney General rather than
his/her appointment by the Governor is explained by drawing an analogy between
corporate general counsel and the general counsel of a state:
Attorney General Clarence Meyer of Nebraska, in response to the
argument that the Governor should be able to appoint his Attorney
General, says that: The president of a large corporation does not
name the general counsel. This is done by the board of directors
and in some cases their action must be confirmed by a vote of the
stockholders. Because of this, the same general counsel sees a
good many presidents come and go.87
Both corporate general counsel and a state's general counsel are required
to give independent legal advice. In the case of the corporate general counsel, her

84

The Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct were promulgated and adopted by the West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals on June 30, 1988, effective January 1, 1989. WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997).
85

MacQueen, 385 S.E.2d at 650 (citing Manchin,296 S.E.2d at 918).

S6 MacQueen, 385 S.E.2d at 650.

" NAAG REPORT, supra note 1, at 67. One delegate of a state constitutional convention (Nebraska)
succinctly explained the separation of powers purpose behind Nebraska's election of an Attorney
General. He explained that, under ordinary circumstances, the judgment of one man [the Governor]

is not better "than the combined judgment of the electors of the state of Nebraska on that proposition
and an Attorney General should be a check on all the officers in the state." Id. at 69.
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independence from the chief executive officer is intended to insure that she will
conform her conduct to the wishes of the board of directors rather than to the will
of a CEO. The state's general counsel, the Attorney General, similarly can be said
to owe her position and allegiance ultimately to the electorate rather than to another
executive officer, the judiciary or the legislature. It is her responsibility to exercise
her independentjudgmentin providing legal services to executive officers, agencies
and the legislature.88
The analogy between corporate and the general counsel of a state is an apt
one which is consistent with a similar suggestion in the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the analogy between corporate ("entity") counsel and government
counsel. As discussed in detail below, the drafters of the Rules found substantial
similarity between the degree of independence required of corporate counsel and
that of government lawyers carrying out their respective ethical responsibilities.89
The Rules examine the ethical responsibilities of lawyers who provide legal
services for an "organization" or "entity" including corporate and government
entities. Rule 1.13 of the West VirginiaRules of ProfessionalConduct relate to a
lawyer's responsibility to an "organization as client."9

88 See Manchin, 296 S.E.2d 909.

'9See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
9'Rule 1.13 provides:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to
act in a manner related to the representation that is a violation of the legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give
due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the
scope and the nature of the lawyers representation, the responsibility in the
organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of
the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations.
Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization
and the risk of revealing information relating to representation to persons outside
the organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the
highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined
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The comments to Rule 1.13 and the general discussion of the "Scope" of
the Rules elaborate upon the ethical responsibilities of the government lawyer. The
comments make clear that government lawyers such as those of the office of the
Attorney General fall within the category of lawyers to which Rule 1.13 applies.91
The Rules explicitly recognize that because the public has a substantial interest in
the work of government lawyers, different considerations may come into play in
situations involving government lawyers than in situations where lawyers represent
private clients: "[W]hen the client is a governmental organization, a different
balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that
the wrongful official act is prevented or rectified,forpublicbusiness is involved."'
For example, while the political appointee who is charged with supervision of a
state agency may make policy decisions for the agency, she is considered by the
Rules to be a "constituent" of the organizational client and not as the client.93

by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal
to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury
to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7 If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders.
WEST VIRGINIA RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.
13 (1997).
9"Comment seven to Rule 1.13 states that "[t]he duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental
organizations." Id. at cmt. 7.
92 Id. (emphasis added).

9 See, e.g., Id. at cmts. 1, 2, which state in relevant part:
An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its
officers, directors, employees, shareholders, and other constituents. Officers,
directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate
organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to
unincorporated associations. "Other constituents" as used in this Comment means
the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by
persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.
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"While in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it is generally
the state as a whole."94
While lawyers employed by the office of the Attorney General must
generally defer to the policy decisions of an agency director or commissioner who
is a constituent of a state agency, "this does not mean, however, that constituents
of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer." 5 Indeed, the Rule
recognizes that, "in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a
government lawyer may have authority to question such conduct more extensively
than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances.'' 6 The
Comment emphasizes that "[t]his Rule does not limit that authority.' 7
The Comments to Rule 1.13 thus explicitly recognize the importance
attached to the government lawyer's representation of his/her organizational client,
as distinguished from representation of an individual who is but a constituent of the
organizational client:
There are times when the organization's interest may be or become
adverse to that of one or more of its constituents. In such
circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose
interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the
conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot
represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain
independent representation.98
The Rules of ProfessionalConduct also recognize the unique function
served by the Attorney General as a government lawyer who owes his or her
ultimate allegiance to the state or an agency as an entity, rather than to the
individuals through which the agency acts:

9' Id. at cmt. 7.
95 WEST VIRGINIA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.13 at cmt. 3 (1997).
96

Id. at cmt. 7.

97 Id.
98 Id. at cmt. 8.55. Comment 8 to Rule 1.13 further explains that "care must be taken to assurc that
the individual understands that, when there is such diversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization
cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the
lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged." Id.
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Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory
and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may
include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes
Also,
in the client in private client-lawyer relationships ....
lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized
to represent several government agencies in intra-governmental
legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could
not represent private clients. 99
Conduct explicitly state that "[t]hese Rules
The West VirginiaRules of Professional
10 0
do not abrogate any such authority."'
The most casual student of human nature would likely predict that a
government official will generally prefer to hire and accept advice from his/her own
in-house lawyer rather than to heed the advice of a lawyer selected by an Attorney
General.' 0 ' When the legislature either condones or itself promotes conflict
between the Attorney General and state agencies and officials by allowing the latter
to retain their own lawyers, it predictably plants fertile seeds for problems and even
allegations of unethical conduct. It is just such legislative action that intrudes
impermissibly into the constitutional core functions of the elected Attorney General.
The job of a lawyer employed by a State Attorney General is one often
infused with great responsibility without commensurate compensation. It simply
is not enough to say, as the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did in
Manchin, that they must conform their conduct to the Rules of Professional
Conduct."2 The presence of in-house and outside counsel employed by state
agencies and officers without the Attorney General's approval or supervision,

IId. The comment on the "Scope" of the Rules suggests such a scenario:
For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of
the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse
judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the Attorney
General and the state's attorney in state government.
Id. at Scope.
100Id.

The reason for such preference is simple. A state Attorney General's Office, like the federal Justice
Department and Solicitor General, must consider broader institutional concerns of government that
may supersede the political or policy preference of an individual agency or officer. Lawyers hired by
the head of an agency have no such institutional concerns or constraints and thus are free to support
whatever partisan or personal agenda the agency or official may have.
0I

"2 Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 919.
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inevitably creates serious conflicts that are fundamentally inconsistent with the
constitutional structure designed by the framers to advance the public.
D.

Duties and Responsibilitiesof The Attorney General Under the Rules of
ProfessionalConduct: JudicialAnalysis

In Manchin, the court held that "[t]he Attorney General has the duty to
conform his conduct to that prescribed by the rules of professional ethics."' 3
Manchin stated that "as a lawyer and an officer of the courts of this state, the
Attorney General is subject to the rules of this Court governing the practice of law
and the conduct of lawyers, which have the force and effect of law."' 4 The
Manchin court listed some of the specific duties to which, under the Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, the Attorney General must conform the conduct of his
office. 05
'
In Manchin, the court "emphasize[d] the importance" of the mandate in the
Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibilitythat lawyers "shall exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client."' 6 While the client must ultimately
choose what policy position to take and what legal course to follow to "vindicate
lawful public policy," the Attorney General "is required to exercise his independent
professional judgment on behalf of a state officer for whom he is bound to provide

103Id. at 912 Syl. Pt. 4.

'4 Id. at 912 Syl. Pt. 5 (emphasis added). The court did not address the separation of powers issue
implicit in its view that an elected executive department officer, the Attorney General, must conform
his conduct to rules set forth by the judicial department. Also, implicit in its holding that the Attorney
General is subject to the Rules of ProfessionalConduct, is the proposition that any other lawyer who
seeks employment with or is otherwise employed to provide legal services to the State is similarly
subject to such Court-promulgated rules.
'- Id. at Syl. Pt 6. The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility referred to in Manchin was superseded
by the Rules of ProfessionalConduct which became effective January 1, 1989. WEST VIRGINIA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997). For the sake of clarity, the latter title will be used herein unless
an earlier version of the Code is referenced in quotation. The ethical duties referred to by the Court
included the mandate that he shall assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal
profession; shall assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available; shall
assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law; shall preserve the confidence and secrets of a
client; shall exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client; shall represent a client
competently; shall represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law; shall assist in improving
the legal system; and shall avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. Manchin, 296
S.E.2d at 920.
' Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 920.
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legal counsel."' 7 The court declared that in the context of litigation "his duty is to
analyze and advise his clients as to the permissible alternative approaches to the
conduct of the litigation." ' The Attorney General "should inform his client of the
different legal strategies and defenses available and of his professional opinion as
to the practical effect and probability of the outcome of each alternative" so that the
state officer may make an intelligent decision with regard to how to proceed.0 9
Subsequent to Manchin, in Lawyer DisciplinaryBoard v. McGraw, ° the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was presented with a case involving
charges that the Attorney General had committed violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct in his representation of the West Virginia Division of
Environmental Protection (DEP), a state agency charged with enforcement of West
Upon complaint filed by the
Virginia's environmental regulatory statutes.'
appointed Director of DEP, the Attorney General was charged by the West Virginia
Lawyer Disciplinary Board with four Rules violations.'
In McGraw, the court
upheld the dismissal of three of the four charges of ethical violations directed at the
Attorney General."' The court upheld the charge that the Attorney General had
violated Rule 1.6(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by revealing client
107

Id.

'0' Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 920.
109

Id.

"0

461 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1995).

"'

McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 851.
2

The Attorney General was charged with the following violations of the West Virginia Rules of

ProfessionalConduct:
(1)
Contacting an intervenor aligned with the DEP in litigation concerning
a solid waste permit and revealing client confidences to the intervenor in violation
of Rule 1.6(a);
(2)
Encouraging a citizen, if she disagreed with a position taken by DEP,
to "apply political pressure to legislators as a means of opposing DEP's position,
in violation of Rule 1.7(b);
(3)
By refusing to advocate in court a change in position taken by DEP
favorable to a landfill operator which the Attorney General found "repugnant,
immoral, unethical and totally improper," in violation of Rule 1.2(a);
(4)
By directing that a copy of"an in-house document" be attached to the
Attorney General's motion to withdraw from representation of DEP, in violation
of Rule 1.6(a).
McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 856-857.
"' McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 851.
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confidences to a third party."' In publicly reprimanding the Attorney General, the
court observed that:
[T]he lawyer's broader ethical duty of confidentiality, embodied in
rule 1.6, "applies in situations other than those where evidence is
sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The
confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the
representation, whatever its source." Comment, Rule 1.6 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Significantly, the duty of
confidentiality binds the lawyer at all times, not only in cases
where he or she faces inquiry from others." 5
The case is instructive in that it reveals the inherent conflicts that arise in
a constitutionally structured divided executive. As observed above, the dispute in
McGraw was between the elected Attorney General and a state agency official
appointed by the Governor." 6 The object of the controversy was an issue of
significant statewide public interest: permit application made to the DEP for the
disposal of large amounts of out-of-state wastes in a landfill." 7
The Attorney General received a credible report that the DEP Director had
indicated a desire to change positions in a court case to align his agency with the
position of the landfill operator aftersummaryjudgment had been grantedagainst
it in favor of the DEP and the intervenors." 8 The Attorney General promptly

"1

Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1)
to prevent the client from committing a criminal act; or
(2)
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of a client.

WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997).
"5 McGrav, 461 S.E.2d. at 860.
116

Id. at 852-856.

" See State ex. rel. Hamrick v. LCS Services, Inc., 414 S.E.2d. 620 (W. Va. 1992); State ex rel.
Hamrick v. LCS Services, Inc., 454 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 1994).

..
S The facts of McGraw highlight the problems that arise when the Attorney General is pitted against
another lawyer working for the government whose views differ from the Attorney General's. In
McGraw, the Deputy Director for DEP, who was herself a lawyer, attended a meeting with the Director
of the DEP and a representative from an adverse party in pending litigation: the landfill operator.
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contacted a representative of an intervenor to inform her of the DEP's change of
position.1 9 This act, the Supreme Court held, violated:
a lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 of the
Rules of ProfessionalConduct [which] applies to all information'
relating to representation of a client, protecting more than just
"confidences" or "secrets" of a client. The ethical duty of
confidentiality is not nullified by the fact that ...someone else is
privy to it. 2 '
The Attorney General apparently did not claim, nor did the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals recognize, that the Rules of ProfessionalConduct distinguishes
between a "constituent" (employee or official) of a governmental organization and
the government itself which the Rules recognize as "the client.''
The dispute between West Virginia's elected Attorney General and the
Governor's appointed DEP Director is not uncommon in state governments with a
divided executive branch. However, one criticism of the McGraw decision is that
the multiple interests that an Attorney General in a divided executive must take into
account are substantially broader than that recognized by the court. Another
criticism is that the court's analysis failed to consider both the government's interest
in maintaining the integrity of the state's environmental regulatory process and the
public's interest in ensuring that government agencies carry out their statutory

McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 853. Neither the Director or Deputy Director informed counsel assigned to
the litigation - a member of the Attorney General's staff- about the meeting. Id. At the meeting, the
parties discussed the litigation with the landfill operator, a non-lawyer. Id. The Deputy Director later
denied that she had been warned by the Attorney General's litigation staff "not to communicate with
LCS [the landfill operator] without the Attorney general's approval or participation." Id. Regardless
of what the true facts may have been, it is clear that the presence of another lawyer, whose views
differed substantially from the Attorney General, greatly complicated the Attorney General's ability
to represent the his client, the state agency. See also Kingwood Coal Co., 1997 WL 406153, at *20
(Starcher, J., dissenting). In Kingwood Coal,Justice Starcher observed other problems relating to the
DEP's representation by in-house counsel. Kingwood Coal Co., 1997 WL 406153, at *20 n.1. The
legislature by statute removed representation of the DEP from the responsibility of the Attorney
General subsequent to the events giving rise to McGraw.
"9 Kingwood Coal Co., 1997 WL 406153, at *20.
20 McGraw, 461 S.E.2d at 861. The court also observed that "we fail to see how [the attorney

General's] voluntary disclosure to Ms. Hogbin, a third party, was impliedly authorized simply because
respondent was directed to file, in the future, a public pleading, and how such disclosure furthered
respondent's legal representation of his client. Id.
"2 See discussion, supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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responsibilities. The failure of the McGraw court to properly identify the "client"
renders the court's analysis incomplete and undermines the persuasiveness of the
opinion."
It was obviously the much broader public interest in checks and balances
between and among the officers of the divided executive and the three branches of
state government that resulted in constitutional provisions requiring the election of
Attorneys General. While the Attorney General, as any other lawyer, has a duty to
represent his or her organizational clients in government, his ultimate fealty under
the Rules of Professional Conduct is not necessarily to bureaucratic political
appointees, or even elected officials -- the "constituents" of the state organization -but to the government as a whole and to rule of law." Thus, when analyzing the
scope of the powers of an elected Attorney General, the Rules of Professional
Conduct help define the contours of that official's relationship with individuals
employed by government, with elected officials, with the government as a whole
and with the public, whose interest was, after all, the constitutional framers' reason
for creating an elected Attorney General in the first instance.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
IN A DIVIDED EXECUTIVE

Decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and official
opinions of past Attorneys General of the state have repeatedly declared the holder
of the office of Attorney General to be the state's "general lawyer." By virtue of
his constitutional title, the court has designated the Attorney General as the state's

" The observation that the court failed to "properly identify the client" is intended to suggest that the
Court simply assumed that the Director of the DEP was "the client" to whom the Attorney General
owed a duty of confidentiality under the Rules of ProfessionalConduct. As observed above however,
the Rules are not susceptible to simple answers where the conduct under examination is that of a
government lawyer. The Rules could not be more explicit in cautioning government lawyers that their
first and primary duty is to their organizationalclient -- the government as a whole. Whether the
conclusions drawn by the court in defining the parameters of the Attorney General's ethical
responsibilities to the DEP Director in McGraw were appropriate remains to be seen. Hopefully, at
the very next opportunity, the court will carefully analyze all relevant provisions of the Rules so as to
clarify its application to government lawyers. Surely those attorneys who faithfully serve the public
are entitled to a more comprehensive examination of the ethical constraints to which they must
conform than that supplied by McGraw.
The very difficult assignment of an Attorney General in a divided executive to represent
government entities within state government who often display wildly divergent legal and political
positions has not received attention by the courts.
3
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"general counsel."' 24 The following discussion reviews cases and scholarly
commentary relating to the status of Attorneys General in other states whose
constitutions also provide for a divided executive department.
A.

ConstitutionallyDesigned Division of Executive DepartmentAuthority:
Internal Checks and Balances

The election requirement of an Attorney General is the rule rather than the
exception in state constitutions of the United States."z One study found that more
than a third of the elected state Attorneys General are members of a political party
different than the party of the incumbent Governor. Implicit in such constitutional
structuring of a divided executive department is the desire to provide checks and
balances on those with executive responsibilities. 26
Where a state constitution calls for the election of the Attorney General for
a finite term of office rather than requiring service at the will and pleasure of the
Governor, constitutional drafters have provided for both the independence of the
state's legal counsel and a check on other components of government within the
constitutional scheme:
The fear of loss of office should not deter the Attorney General
from issuing an opinion. Since his duties are of the highest order,

124Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 917.
'2 As of 1990, 43 of the 50 state constitutions provided for the election of an Attorney General; only
5 state constitutions provided for appointment of the Attorney General by the Governor. One was
appointed by the state supreme court (Tennessee) and one was appointed by the legislature (Maine).
NAAG REPORT, supra note 1, 15.

26 The creation of such strong internal intra-executive checks and balances as well the separation of

inter-departmental powers has been recognized as underlying the constitutionally mandated election
of Attorneys General:
The primary argument for the election of an Attorney General is that he is an
attorney for all of the people, and should be chosen by them. He is the Governor's
advisor, but not exclusively; the Governor is merely one among many clients. By
making the Attorney General directly responsible to the electorate, he remains
subject to the ultimate source of power and will be more responsive to public
needs.... Another argument... is that the legislative branch may also rely on
him for advice. In some states [including West Virginia] he also has
responsibilities toward the judiciary branch, such as serving as court reporter.
Thus he should not be responsible to any single branch of government, but can
serve to strengthen checks and balances within the system.
Id. at 66-67. West Virginia's Attorney General has statutory responsibilities to all three branches of
state government.
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as high as any judicial officer, he should enjoy the same
independence as a member of the judiciary. He should not be a
creature of the Governor, but should render opinions solely on the
basis of law. He should not be an advocate for a particular
administration . 127
During the consideration of the 1968 constitution of the State of New York
the importance of an independent elected Attorney General in a divided executive
structure of constitutional governance was explained:
To sum it up -- an elected Attorney General has a measure of
independence and a sense of personal and direct responsibility to
the public. The elected official has a natural and impelling desire
to be creative and to exercise broader initiative in the service of the
public. He is free of the fear of dismissal by any superior official
if he should exercise contrary independent judgment. He is in the
best position to render maximum service to the People and
impartial advice to the Governor, the Legislature and State
departments and agencies. He can appear in Court without fear or
12
favor -- an attorney in the fullest and finest sense of the word. 1
As in the great majority of the constitutions of her sister states, West
Virginia's constitution creates a "divided" or "non-unified" executive department
comprised of separately-elected executive officers, including an Attorney
General. 129 The requirement that these officers stand for election compels one to

127 Id. at

67.

12' Id. at 66 (quoting Louis J. Lefkowitz, Position Paperof Louis K LeJkowitz, Attorney General, to

ConstitutionalConvention, Committee on the Executive Branch (June 1, 1967, Albany, N.Y.).
'2'

The historical roots of the election of state Attorneys General lie in notions of a Jacksonian

democracy:

Andrew Jackson's administration brought a new political ethic to American
government. The common man was deemed competent to vote and hold office.
Short terms of office ensured popular control of government, and direct election
of officials became the rule. State constitutions provided for the election of
numerous officials, including the Attorney General in most instances.
Id. at 64. See also Louis E. LAMBERT,

MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 187

(W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960) ("Jacksonian democracy, however, also brought disadvantages where
the governorship was concerned. A number of state administrative offices were created, and popular
democracy decreed that they should be filled by the action of the voters. As the governor moved into
a position of political leadership, he simultaneously suffered a loss of administrative control.").
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conclude that the constitution's framers clearly intended to imbue each of them with
a substantial degree of independence.
The constitutional scheme that creates an independently elected Attorney
General and other executive officers thus provides internal checks and balances
within the executive department akin, by analogy, to the familiar "three branch"
separation of powers structure of the federal and state governments. 3 Moreover,
like most state constitutions, article V, section 1, of the West Virginia Constitution
explicitly requires separation of powers between the three branches."' This
constitutional separation of powers mandate acts as an explicit check on the power
of the legislative branch to intrude into the core functions of elected constitutional
executive department officers.
B.

Legislative Power to Alter Implicit Duties of Elected Constitutional
Officers
1.

Experience of States Other Than West Virginia

Many courts have held that implicit in the constitutionally designated titles
of the elected officers of divided executive departments is a constitutional limitation
on the authority of the legislature to significantly alter the powers and duties of
those officers. One court has observed that:
[t]he mandate in [the Minnesota Constitution], that the executive
department shall consist of a governor . . . and [an] attorney
general, implicitly places a limitation on the power of the
legislature . . . to prescribe the duties of such offices. The
limitation is implicit in the specific titles the drafters gave to the
132
individual offices.
One commentator has observed that "the independently elected Cabinet officers [under the
constitution of the State of Florida], responsible separately to the electorate, tend to buck up and block
capricious, mischievous, or autocratic abuses by the Governor and his appointed administrators." M.
B. Johnson, Why We Should Keep Florida'sElected Cabinet, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603 (1978). The
commentator refers to Florida's constitutional separation of executive department powers as a
"safeguard against gubernatorial absolutism." Id.
130

131

West Virginia Constitution article V, section 1, states in relevant part: "The legislative, executive

and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers
properly belonging to either of the others ......" W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1; see also State ex reL State
Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1966) (stating that "the phraseology of this article
follows that of the constitutions of Virginia and other older states").
132 State ex. rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986).
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Similarly, each independent constitutional officer of West Virginia's executive
department must be seen as exclusively invested with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to their respective offices. With regard to intrusion into the core
constitutional power and duty of West Virginia's Attorney General, a further
constitutional impediment exists. Article VII, section 4, limits the power of other
executive officers to choose who will provide legal services for their own offices
insofar as it prohibits any executive officer mentioned in that article from
simultaneously holding any other office.'33
In addition to banning dual office holding by executive officers, implicit in
article VII, section 4, is the proposition that the duties and responsibilities of each
executive officer may be exercised only by that officer. Thus, the Treasurer may
not usurp and perform duties of the Secretary of State, and the Agricultural
Commissioner may not perform the work of the Auditor. It follows that article VII,
section 4, bars any officer of the executive department from usurping the duty of the
Attorney General to provide and supervise legal services to the state.
In addition, article V, section 1, of the West Virginia Constitution
specifically mandates the separation of powers between the three branches of the
state's government: "The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be
separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging
to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one
of them at the same time ....""4 In mandating that the legislative department
remain separate and distinct from the executive department, article V, section 1,
limits the power of the legislature to take from the Attorney General the
responsibility to provide legal services to entities of state government and give that
responsibility to another elected or appointed state officer.
West Virginia Code section 5-3-1 is consistent with the Constitution's
mandate that the state's legal services shall be supervised by the Attorney General,
to the extent that it prohibits payment of state funds for legal service provided by
persons or firms other than the Attorney General. Judicial decisions in other
jurisdictions also support the view that there is a substantial state constitutional
basis for barring legislative branch incursions into the implicit duties and
responsibilities of elected constitutional executive officers.

133Those state executive officers mentioned in VII, section 4 are the Governor, Auditor, Treasurer,
Agriculture Commissioner, and Secretary of State. W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
134Id. at art. V,

§ 1.
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For example, in Blair v. MaryeY 5 as well as in subsequent cases before the
court, the Supreme Court of Virginia has observed that a legislature does not have
the power to take duties away from the constitutional office of Attorney General
and give them to one whose office is created by mere statute:
The office of attorney general of Virginia, is of constitutional
creation, and not of legislative enactment.... We think it may
fairly be assumed in the outset to be an undeniable proposition,
that the two branches of the legislature, as the direct
representatives of the people, have the right, when no restrictions
have been imposed upon them, either in express terms, or by
necessary implication, by the constitution, to create and abolish
offices accordingly as they may regard them as necessary or
superfluous. And that they may also under like circumstances,
deprive the officers of their salaries, either directly by removing
them from office, or indirectly by so changing the organization of
the departments to which they are attached as to leave them
without a place. But, of course, this power in the legislature
cannot be construed to extend to any of the various classes of
officers which are known as constitutionalofficers.'36
In Ex ParteCorliss,the Supreme Court of North Dakota was faced with an
attempt by that state's legislature to remove duties and responsibilities from the
constitutional office of County Sheriff and State's Attorney and place them within
the purview of a legislatively created office of Enforcement Commissioner.137 In
rejecting this legislative act as unconstitutional, the North Dakota Supreme Court
observed that:
If the legislative assembly has the power to do this, why has it not
the power to provide for the appointment of a special enforcement
Governor, or a special enforcement Attorney General... ? The
Governor [and] the Attorney General are no more constitutional
officers than are state's attorneys and sheriffs. It seems too

13580
36

Va. 485 (1895).

See Blair v. Marye, 80 Va. at 491 (quoting Foster v. Jones, 79 Va. 642 (1884) (citing Loving v.

Auditor, 76 Va. 942 (1882); Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62 Pa. 343 (1869); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.

(6 Cranch) 87 (1810)). See also Fant v. Gibbs, 54 Miss. 396, 410-411 (1877).
Ex Parte Corliss, 114 N.W. 962, 964 (N. D. 1907).
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obvious for discussion that the framers of the Constitution, in
providing for the election of these officers by the people, thereby
reserved unto themselves the right to have the inherent functions
theretofore pertaining to said offices discharged only by persons
elected as therein provided. The naming of these officers
amounted to an implied restriction upon legislative authority to
create other and appointive officers for the discharge of such
functions.
Ex Parte Corliss and the Virginia cases express the fundamental
proposition that when a state constitution creates a constitutional office, the
legislature may not by mere statute alter the core functions of that office. This is
certainly not a novel concept. That the legislature may not alter a constitutional
structure absent a constitutional amendment is so well established in state and
federal constitutional law as to be axiomatic.
The constitutional flaw implicit in legislative schemes that diminish the
inherent duties and responsibilities of elected constitutional officers is apparent
when one examines the constitutionally created executive offices of Auditor and
Treasurer. Clearly those officers were intended by constitutional framers to
perform the core functions of a Treasurer and an Auditor: banking state funds,
monitoring income and approving expenditures of state moneys in the case of the
former office and review and auditing of state books of account in the case of the
latter office. Just as the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found explicit in
the title "Attorney General" the proposition that the holder of the title is the state's
general lawyer, so too is it explicit in the titles "Treasurer" and "Auditor" that the
holders of those offices are to perform the banking and auditing functions of West
1 39
Virginia's state government.

...Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized the structural separation of powers design
implicit in constitutions which apportions and allocates powers and responsibilities between and
among elected executive officers and branches of government:
[W]hen the people have declared [in the state Constitution] that certain powers
shall be possessed and duties performed by a particular officer or department, their
exercise and discharge by any other officer or department are forbidden by a
necessary and unavoidable implication. Every positive delegation of power to one
officer or department implies a negation of its exercise by any other officer,
department or person. If it did not, the whole constitutional fabric might be
undermined and destroyed.
Id.
"' While no state statute analogous to West Virginia Code section 5-3-1, prohibits expenditure of state
funds to individuals or firms to bank state revenues or assume responsibility for auditing the handling
of state revenues, the assignment of those functions to someone other than the elected Treasurer and
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Precisely such a situation presented itself to the supreme courts of Arizona
and Illinois with regard to legislative usurpation of the constitutional duties of the
elected Arizona State Auditor and Illinois Treasurer. The Arizona Court quoted
Judge Cooley for the proposition that:
Theframe of the government, the grant of legislative power itself,
the organization of the executive authority, the erection of the
principal courts ofjustice, create implied limitations upon the law
making authorityas strong as through a negative was expressed in
each instance. 4 '
Said the Court of a constitutionally mandated executive department:
Clearly under the constitution the auditor is a member of the
executive department of the state. Under our system of
government, and of the state governments of the United States
from the organization of the colonies and the states under our
federal constitution, the offices of governor, secretary of state, state
auditor, state treasurer and attorney general, have had a
well-understood meaning .... To make a free and independent
constitutional officer subservient to the dictates of some appointive
officer is equivalent to abolishing the office and creating another
in lieu thereof to exercise the duties and functions belonging to the
first office."'
Thus in Hudson v. Kelly, the Supreme Court of Arizona declared
unconstitutional legislation that removed core functions of the elected state auditor,
a constitutional executive officer. It then assigned these functions to the
Commissioner of Finance, a non-constitutional official appointed by the Governor.
Auditor would seem patently violative of the explicit constitutional separation of powers structure of
West Virginia's Executive department. See W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
140Hudson v. Kelly, 263 P.2d 362, 367 (Ariz. 1953) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 88 (1927)) (third emphasis added). It is noteworthy that the Arizona Supreme Court had

previously decided that "no common law powers or duties attach to the.., enumerated constitutional
officers, but only those prescribed by statute." Shute v. Frohmiller, 90 P.2d 998 (Ariz. 1939).
Manchin relied in part on Shute in concluding that the Attorney General of West Virginia possesses
no common law powers. Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 915-916. The fact that an Attorney General
possesses no common law powers is not relevant to the issue of the power of the legislature to
designate someone other than the Attorney General to perform legal services for the state.
141

Hudson, 263 P.2d at 365, 369.
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The Hudson Court recognized that the State Auditor was the general accountantof
the state whose core duties are inherent in Arizona's constitutional scheme:
With the advent of statehood the auditor became a constitutional
officer, with its incumbent being elected by the people .... The
duties of the officer now and always have been those of the general
accountant of the state . . . . Such officer has always been
independent, responsible only to the law, his bond and the electors
at the polls.' 42
While the Arizona Constitution, like that of West Virginia, provides that the
legislature may require a constitutional executive officer to perform such duties as
provided by law, in Hudson the court emphasized that by virtue of the state
Auditor's constitutional status the legislative power to prescribe duties of the office
is subject to implied limitation:' "There was a purpose in the creation of the office
of auditor which, by this Act, has been frustrated. We are not hesitant in holding
that there exists the implied restrictionagainst abolishing a constitutional office, in
fact, if not in name.""' Moreover, the Arizona court observed that a legislature has
no power, in the absence of express constitutional authority, "'to add to a

142

Id. at 366.

,43 The Arizona constitutional provision at issue created the state's executive department. That
provision contains essentially the same language as article VII, section 1 of the Constitution of West
Virginia. West Virginia Constitution, article VII, section 1, provides in relevant part: "The executive
department shall consist of a governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, commissioner of
agriculture, and attorney general .... [They] shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law."
W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. The Arizona Constitution article V, section 1, provides in relevant part:
"The executive department of the state shall consist of governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state
treasurer, attorney general, and superintendent of public instruction .... They shall perform such
duties as are prescribed by this constitution and as may be provided by law." Hudson, 263 P.2d at 365.
Id. at 367 (emphasis added). The court in Ex Parte Corliss further observed the effect of legislative
usurpation of the powers of a constitutional officer, observing that:
This result could be as effectually accomplished by the creation of new officers
and departments exercising the same power and jurisdiction as by the direct and
formal abrogation of those now existing. And, although the exercise of this power
by the Legislature is nowhere expressly prohibited, nevertheless they cannot do
so. The people having in their sovereign capacity exerted the power and
determined who shall be their Auditor, there is nothing left for the Legislature to
act upon.
Ex ParteCorliss, 114 N.W. at 970 (quoting People ex reL Metro. St. Ry. Co. v. Tax Comm'rs, 67 N.E.
69 (N.Y. 1903)).
1'

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss4/7

42

McGinley: Separation of Powers, State Constitutions & the Attorney General:
19971

SEPARATION OF POWERS & THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

constitutional office duties
foreign to that office" nor may it "'take away duties that
45
naturally belong to it."'
In accord with Ex Parte Corliss, is American Legion Post No. 279 v.
Barrett, 46 a case involving the Illinois State Treasurer.147 In that case the Illinois
Supreme Court observed that:
It is a rule frequently stated by this court, that the General
Assembly may not take away from a constitutional officer the
powers and duties given [to] him by the constitution. The
constitution, by section 1 of article V, provides that public officers
including the State Treasurer, shall perform such duties as may be
required by law. Nothing in the constitution further defines the
duties of the State Treasurer. This court has held that those duties
are such as are to be impliedfrom the nature of the office and of
them he may not be deprived or relieved.'48
Thus, from the cases reviewed above, it appears that there is significant authority
in other states emphatically rejecting legislative attempts to dilute the powers of
constitutional officers by statutorily assigning the officers' core constitutional
duties to another individual or entity.
West Virginia's constitutional jurisprudence does not contain any cases
which relate to legislative attempts to usurp the prerogatives of an elected executive

"' Id. at 369 (quoting State ex rel. Josephs Douglas, 110 P. 177, 180 (Nev. 1926)). The Arizona
court also quoted other pertinent portions of Douglas: "It is well settled by the courts that the
legislature, in the absence of special authorization in the Constitution, is without power to abolish a
constitutional office or to change, alter or modify its constitutional powers and functions." Id.
146 20

N.E.2d 45, 51 (Ill. 1939).

"47 The language of the Illinois constitution creating the executive department of that state is
substantially the same as the language of West Virginia Constitution, article VII, section 1.
14' Barrett,20 N.E.2d at 51 (emphasis added); see also Allen v. Rampton, 463 P.2d 7 (Utah 1969)
(holding unconstitutional removal of duties from state treasurer, where such duties, though not
specified in the state constitution, predated statehood); Thompson v. Legislative Audit Comm., 448
P.2d 799, 801-2 (N.M. 1968) (holding unconstitutional a statute removing duties implicit in office of
state auditor, even though duties not expressly enumerated in the constitution); cf Murphy v. Yates,
348 A.2d 837, 846 (Md. 1975) (holding unconstitutional statute creating office of state prosecutor
independent of attorney general who retained common-law prosecutorial powers: "If an office is
created by the Constitution ... the position can neither be abolished by statute nor reduced to
impotence by the transfer of duties characteristic of the office to another office created by the
legislature .... We regard this as but another facet of the principle of separation of powers.") (citations
omitted).
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officer by transferring them to another executive officer. West Virginia case law
is replete, however, with cases involving constitutional separation of powers
disputes between and among the three branches of the state government. The
broader fundamental constitutional principles of these cases are relevant to a
discussion of the legislature's power to displace the core functions of the Attorney
General by either assigning them to in-house counsel of a state agency or office or
by allowing an agency or office to retain butside counsel without approval or
supervision by the Attorney General.
In a scholarly recent opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, Justice Recht provided a historical overview of the court's separation of
powers cases and found that the legislature had violated constitutional separation
of powers strictures.' 49 In In re Dailey,5 the Court held that a statute which
imposed upon West Virginia trial court judges the responsibility of reviewing and
issuing permits to carry concealed weapons was an unconstitutional attempt to
expand the powers of the judiciary.' 5 ' Finding that "the regulation and control of
dangerous weapons is exclusively within the police power of the State exercised
through the Legislature and not the judiciary," the Court observed that "the
Legislature cannot commit to the judiciary powers which are primarily
legislative."' 52
In a quite different context, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
twice held enactments creating schemes for the legislative veto of executive agency
regulations to be violative of constitutional separation of powers principles. In
State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin,"53 the court rejected a statutory legislative veto
procedure. Finding that the legislature had attempted to assume executive branch
regulatory powers, the court held:

149

In re Dailey, 465 S.E.2d 601, 602 (W. Va. 1995).

ISo 465

S.E.2d 601.

IS! Justice Recht's opinion for the court provides an excellent overview of West Virginia's separation
of powers jurisprudence. It identifies Hodges v. PublicService Commission, 159 S.E. 834 (W. Va.
1931) as the "seminal opinion which sanctions the doctrine of separation of powers." In re Dailey, 465
S.E.2d at 604. 'See Kenneth C. Davis, JudicialReview ofAdministrative Action in West Virginia--A
Study in Separation ofPowers, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 270 (1938); Robert T. Donley, The Hodges Case and
Beyond, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 291 (1939). See also Sims v. Fisher, 25 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1943); State v.
Huber, 40 S.E.2d 11 (W. Va.1946); Appalachian Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 296 S.E.2d 887
(W. Va.1982).
352

In re Dailey, 465 S.E.2d at Syl. Pts. 3 & 4; see also Hodges, 159 S.E. 834 (W. Va.1931).

113

279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
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Article V, section 1 of the state constitution provides: The
legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate
and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly
belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the
This
powers of more than one of them at the same time ....
constitutional provision which prohibits any one department of our
state government from exercising the powers of the others is not
merely a suggestion; it is part of the fundamental law of our State
and, as such, it must be strictly construed and closely followed.
Where one branch of our state government seeks to exercise or to
impinge upon the powers conferred to another branch, we are
compelled by this mandate to restrain such action, absent a specific
constitutional provision permitting such interference.'54
A decade and a half later, the court turned back a somewhat more
sophisticated effort to exercise a legislative veto in State ex rel. Meadows v.
Hechler."' In Meadows the court explained the importance of the concept of
separation of powers in terms applicable to the issue discussed herein:
The Constitution, in distributing the powers of government creates
three distinct and separate departments -- the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial. This separation is not merely a matter
of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic
and vital, namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially
different powers of government in the same hands. If it be
important thus to separate the several departments of government

I5
Id. at 630-631 (emphasis added).

1 462 S.E.2d 586 (W. Va. 1995). In Meadows the court rejected a statute that permitted
administrative regulations to "die" if the legislature failed to approve them within a time certain.
Justice Workman's opinion, which was consistent with the reasoning of a plethora of courts and
leading constitutional scholars, evoked strident criticism from some legislative leaders apparently
unconversant with the separation of powers doctrine as a basic tenet of constitutional law. Justice
Workman's quotation of the following famous statement of Justice Brandeis fell on deaf ears: "The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1887, not to promote efficiency
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to
save the people from autocracy." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The West Virginia legislators' failure to comprehend fundamental constitutional separation of powers
principles reveals the wisdom of the system of checks and balances established by the constitutional
framers who foresaw the never ending efforts of those in government to usurp powers reserved to
others.
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and restrict them to the exercise of their appointed powers, it
follows, as a logical corollary... that each department should be
kept completely independent of the others.., in the sense that the
acts of each shall never be controlledby, or subjected, directly of
indirectly, to the coercive influence of either of the other
departments.56
State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, State ex rel. Meadows v. Hechler and In re Dailey
are three of many West Virginia cases that recognize the fundamental importance
of the constitutional separation of powers restriction. These cases strongly support
the view that attempts by the West Virginia Legislature to assign to other executive
officers and agencies the power to employ and supervise lawyers clearly violates
the proscriptions of article V, section 1, of the West Virginia Constitution.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that statutes purporting to allow West
Virginia agencies and officials to retain their own in-house counsel and/or employ
outside counsel run directly counter to the West Virginia Court's recent admonition
in Meadows: one branch shall never be controlledby, or subjected, directly or
indirectly,to the coercive influence of either of the otherdepartments.57
' Moreover,
it is also difficult to imagine a more direct attempt to coercively influence another
branch than legislatively limiting the duties of the state's general counsel and
supplanting her authority by the simple yet effective method of transferring them
to others.
Thus, as set forth above, there is a wealth of precedent that informs as to
limitations on the power of state legislatures to remove all or a substantial portion
of an elected constitutional executive officer's powers and transfer them to other
officers or entities of state government. There is virtually no logic or law that
supports such a realignment of constitutional structures.
VI. CONCLUSION

Article VII, section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution created the elected
office of Attorney General, explicitly designating the holder of that office as the
chief legal officer or general counsel for the state.'5 8 Elected executive officers are
156 Meadows, 462

S.E.2d at 589 (quoting State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449, 453 (W. Va.
1966)) (emphasis added); see also O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933).
157

Id.

It is possible that some may contend that, because article VII, section 1, states that elected executive
officers "shall perform such duties as are prescribed by law," the legislature has the unbridled power
and complete discretion to take away core functions from one executive officer and give them to
'5
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intended to have a substantial degree of independence from each other by
constitutional design. The elected Attorney General's independence is sharply
contrasted by the lack of independence of in-house or outside counsel who serve
at the will and pleasure of appointed or elected officials.
The structural design of the West Virginia Constitution, 5 9 the Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal decisions
in Manchin v. Browning and later cases require that the Attorney General play the
role of an independent general counsel. Such independence as well as the viability
of the constitutionally imposed attorney-client relationship between Attorney
General and state entities is significantly compromised where lawyers neither
chosen nor supervised by the Attorney General provide legal services to the state.
Myriad conflicts inevitably arise when the state client is represented both by the
state's constitutionally designated lawyer and a lawyer employed by, and thus
beholden to, others.
The legislature of West Virginia clearly lacks the power to assign to another
the functions of the Attorney General. The Attorney General holds a
constitutionally created executive department office by virtue of popular election.
The fundamental constitutional separation of powers doctrine explicit in article V,
section 1, prevents the legislature from transferring the core functions of the state's
general counsel by statutorily assigning such duties to other appointed or elected
executive officials.
Moreover, without the oversight and coordination of the Attorney General's
office, extremely important matters of general administrative law and procedure
may be seriously undermined by the conflicting opinions of outside and in-house

another. See generally W. VA. CONsT. art. VII, § 1. If such legislative power existed, it could logically
be extended to achieve absurd results. For example, it would be possible for the legislature to assign
powers of the purse to the Attorney General, powers of auditing to the Secretary of State, and the
power of the governor as the state's chief law enforcement officer to the Agriculture Commissioner.
As courts in other jurisdictions have held, the legislature's power to prescribe the duties of an elected
executive officer emphatically do not include the power to take from that elected officer some or all
of her/his core functions and invest them in another.
159See W. VA. CoNsT. art. V,

§ 1, art. VII, §§ 1,4. As observed in the discussion above, the Supreme

Court of Appeals of West Virginia has recognized the Attorney General as the state's general counsel
and chief legal officer consistent with both article V, section 1 and article VII, sections 1 and 4. As
such, the court has held that the Attorney General is bound to conform her/his conduct to the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Manchin, 461 S.E.2d at 851. The Rules of ProfessionalConduct, in turn,
emphasize the necessity that lawyers representing an organizational entity exercise her/his independent
judgment in representation of the entity. Moreover, the Rules specifically recognize that the lawyer
for a governmental entity has special cause to exercise independent judgment because the public's
business is involved and because the state itself is the client rather than a particular individual who is
but a constituent part of state government. See WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.6 (1997).
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counsel employed by agencies and state officials. As discussed above, the in-house
or outside lawyer who serves at the will and pleasure of an agency director or
another executive officer lacks the capacity to render truly independent legal
judgment. The dependent nature of such lawyer's role stands in stark contrast to the
Attorney General, who is beholden only to the voters and the rule of law. Thus, any
legislative attempt to assign the core functions of the state's Attorney General to
another public official necessarily disrupts constitutional checks and balances,
violates the West Virginia Constitution's explicit separation of powers mandate of
article V, section 1 and disempowers citizens. At bottom, legislative assignment of
the implicit duties of one constitutionally elected executive officer to someone else
constitutes a raw usurpation of power.
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